1926 in Melbourne geboren, studierte er vier Jahre lang in Sydney Philosophie, um dann 1952 bis 1954 in Oxford das von Gilbert Ryle neu eingerichtete, in zwei Jahren zum B.Phil. He gives the example of a woman who has learned her husband is dead but cannot bring herself to believe her husband is dead. Zurück. Mumford cites the frequently-used example of the moa bird: "It is supposed that every bird of this now-extinct species died at a young age, though not because of anything in its genetic makeup. [47], Armstrong holds to a physicalist, functionalist theory of the mind. [36], Armstrong argues that states of affairs are distinct things in ontology because they are more than the sum of their parts. Danach war er in den Jahren 1954/55 als Dozent (Lecturer) an der London University tätig. [20] Armstrong collaborated with C. B. Martin on a collection of critical essays on John Locke and George Berkeley. He previously married Madeleine Annette Haydon in 1950. But Armstrong differs on this: the unconfident examinee has a belief that Queen Elizabeth I died in 1603, he knows that she died in 1603, but he does not know that he knows. [27], Armstrong rejects nominalist accounts of properties that attempt to align properties simply with classes. Stephen Mumford, David Armstrong, Acumen, 2007, 206pp., $22.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781844651009. "[41] Under the theory of Armstrong, Tooley and Dretske, such a coincidence would not be a law of nature. 1956 ging er nach Australien zurück und lehrte an der Universität Melbourne (1956–1963). It may be the case that R (a, b) obtains in the world but R (b, a) does not. He also says that "Plato in his later works, Aristotle and the Scholastic Realists were ahead of contemporary philosophy in this matter, although handicapped by the relative backwardness of the science and the scientific methodology of their day". How Armstrong's theory of universals deals with relations with varying adicities has been raised as an issue by Fraser MacBride. Bertrand Russell, “The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds” Gilbert Ryle, “Descartes’s Myth” David M. Armstrong, “The Nature of Mind” Multiple-Choice. Coextension is a problem they face: if properties are simply classes, in a world where all blue things are also wet, class nominalists are unable to draw a distinction between the property of being blue and being wet. Radford presents this as an example of knowledge without belief. Armstrong simply states that the disposition is simply in the nature of the instantiated properties of the thing which is supposed to have the disposition. Diese stellt sich Armstrong jedoch in dem Sinne als abhängig von Gegenständen vor, dass sie nicht unabhängig von ihnen existieren können. Ab 1964 war er Professor an der University of Sydney bis zu seiner Emeritierung 1992. Seine Hauptarbeitsgebiete waren die Philosophie des Geistes, Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie. David (D. M.) Armstrong is one of Australia's greatest philosophers. David Malet Armstrong, oft D. M. Armstrong (* 8. To say that these are distinct senses of the wordpresupposes that universal and abstract object do notmean the same thing. [54][55], Armstrong presents a response to Colin Radford's modified version of the "unconfident examinee" example. Armstrong, David Malet. Armstrong, David Malet. David Armstrong (Philosophy Now, Band 11) | Mumford, Stephen | ISBN: 9780773533318 | Kostenloser Versand für alle Bücher mit Versand und Verkauf duch Amazon. And in fact they do not. Maya Eddon: Armstrong on Quantities and Resemblance (PDF; 2,4 MB), Philosophical Studies 136 (2007) 385-404; Daniel von Wachter: David Armstrong, in: Information Philosophie 5/2002, S. 24–29 (PDF; 46 kB) Daniel von Wachter: How to Misunderstand David Armstrong’s Theory of Possibility (PDF; 106 kB) Professor David Armstrong – obituary. Die Ontologie aus grundlegenden, bei Armstrong immer physischen, Gegenständen und Eigenschaften sollen in einem starken realistischen Sinne das beschreiben, was es wirklich gibt. Seine Hauptarbeitsgebiete waren die Philosophie des Geistes, Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie. As Armstrong has said on more than one occasion, he has found it a genuine pleasure to spend his life, as D.C. Williams once put it, “grubbing around in the roots of being.” He is well known for his work on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and for his defence of a factualist ontology, a functionalist theory of the mind, an externalist epistemology, and a necessitarian conception of the laws of nature. Philosophie. Part IV: Minds, Bodies, and Persons. Dieser besagt, dass es neben Gegenständen auch noch Eigenschaften als respektable, grundlegende Entitäten gebe. [11], Armstrong married Jennifer Mary de Bohun Clark in 1982 and had step children. [42] Armstrong believes that the challenge that dispositionalism presents for his account of laws of nature is not in the case of manifested dispositions (say, a glass dropping on the ground and breaking) but unmanifested dispositions (the fact that counter factually if one were to drop the glass on the ground, it would break). Armstrong: Sydney's most distinguished philosopher: life and work", "David Armstrong and Australian Materialism", "The KK (Knowing that One Knows) Principle", David Armstrong (1926-2014), Sydney philosopher, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=David_Malet_Armstrong&oldid=1013648030, Fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, All Wikipedia articles written in Australian English, Wikipedia articles with BIBSYS identifiers, Wikipedia articles with CINII identifiers, Wikipedia articles with PLWABN identifiers, Wikipedia articles with SELIBR identifiers, Wikipedia articles with SNAC-ID identifiers, Wikipedia articles with SUDOC identifiers, Wikipedia articles with Trove identifiers, Wikipedia articles with WORLDCATID identifiers, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License, This page was last edited on 22 March 2021, at 18:51. [8], In 1974, when the University of Sydney's Philosophy department split into two departments[9]—the Department for General Philosophy and the Department for Traditional and Modern Philosophy—Armstrong joined the latter along with David Stove and Keith Campbell, while the former department pursued more radical politics and taught courses on Marxism and feminism. David M. Armstrong - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93. A student is asked when Queen Elizabeth I died, and he hesitatingly answers "1603" and exhibits no confidence in his answer. (1926- ) David Malet Armstrong's book Knowledge, Truth and Belief (1973, pp.150-61) contains an important analysis of the infinite regress of inferences - "reasons behind the reasons" - first noticed by Plato in the Theatetus (200D-201C). His chief philosophical achievement has been the development of a core metaphysical programme, embracing the topics of universals, laws, modality and facts: a naturalistic metaphysics, consistent with a scientific view of the natural world. [25], Armstrong's theory of universals treats relations as having no particular ontological difficulty, they can be treated in the same way non-relational properties are. One bird could have escaped the virus only to be eaten by a predator on the day before its fiftieth birthday. [43], Regarding truth, Armstrong holds to what he describes as a "maximalist version" of truthmaker theory: he believes that every truth has a truthmaker, although there doesn't necessarily exist a one-to-one mapping between truth and truthmaker. Armstrong vertrat einen reduktiven Physikalismus. Literatur von und über David Malet Armstrong, How to Misunderstand David Armstrong’s Theory of Possibility, https://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=David_Malet_Armstrong&oldid=208853082, Mitglied der American Academy of Arts and Sciences, „Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike“, australischer Philosoph und Hochschullehrer. One obvious task for an introductory text concerning the work of a particular philosopher is to express the central ideas of that philosopher in as clear a manner as possible. [10] The two departments were reunified in 2000. [14], To mark the 50th anniversary in 2014 of Armstrong's appointment to the Challis Chair of Philosophy at Sydney University, Quadrant magazine published a tribute to him (originally written in 1991) by David Stove[15] and an overview of Armstrong's work by Andrew Irvine. Cookie-Einstellungen Diese Website benutzt Cookies, die für den technischen Betrieb der Website erforderlich sind und stets gesetzt werden. [56], Armstrong receiving his doctorate of letters (h.c.) at Nottingham University, UK on 13 December 2007, Proceedings of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, Haecceitism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), "Why does Australia have an outsized influence on philosophy? The word ‘Nominalism’, as used by contemporaryphilosophers in the Anglo-American tradition, is ambiguous. Cookie-Einstellungen Diese Website benutzt Cookies, die für den technischen Betrieb der Website erforderlich sind und stets gesetzt werden. Mai 2014 in Sydney), war ein australischer Philosoph und Professor an der University of Sydney. David Lewis produced a body of philosophical writing that, in four books and scores of articles, spanned every major philosophical area, with perhaps the greatest concentration in metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind. In Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, Armstrong states that his philosophical system rests upon "the assumption that all that exists is the space time world, the physical world as we say". Philosophie. David Malet Armstrong (* 8. [51] Here, Armstrong's view is broadly similar to that of Alvin Goldman and Robert Nozick. His chief philosophical achievement has been the development of a core metaphysical programme, embracing the topics of universals, laws, modality and facts: a naturalistic metaphysics, consistent with a scientific view of the natural world. Mai 2014 in Sydney) war ein australischer Philosoph und Professor an der University of Sydney. Im Anschluss erfolgte ein Aufbaustudium an der Oxford University von 1952 bis 1954. [16][17], Armstrong's philosophy is broadly naturalistic. Armstrong gilt zudem als einer der wichtigsten Vertreter eines reduktiven Materialismus in der Philosophie des Geistes. Diese Seite wurde zuletzt am 15. If some particular a has a non-symmetric relation R to another particular b, then R (a, b) differs from R (b, a). David Malet Armstrong (8 July 1926 – 13 May 2014),[4] often D. M. Armstrong, was an Australian philosopher. According to Armstrong, complex relations which seem to challenge the principle are not ontologically real but are second-order properties that can be reduced to more basic properties that subscribe to the Principle of Instantial Invariance. He justifies this by saying that the physical world "seems obviously to exist" while other things "seem much more hypothetical". Am 13. David M. Armstrong. Objects have structure: they have parts, those parts are made of molecules, which are in turn made up of atoms standing in relation to one another, which are in turn made up of subatomic particles and so on. • Berkeley's Theory of Vision: A Critical Examination of Bishop Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. In this essay, Armstrong outlines a philosophical account of the mind that is compatible with the Materialist scientific view of the mind. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1960. David Armstrong is one of Australia's greatest philosophers. Armstrong rejects the KK Principle—that to know some thing p, one must know that one knows p.[54][55] Armstrong's rejection of the KK Principle is consistent with his wider externalist project. He provides an analogy to the argument in Euthyphro: to say that electrons are electrons because they are part of the class of electrons puts the cart before the horse. Presentists, Armstrong argues, must either deny that truthmakers are needed for statements about the past, or account for them "by postulating rather strange truthmakers". Dezember 2007 bekam er den Doctor of Letters (h. c.) der University of Nottingham, England verliehen. [32], In terms of the origin of Armstrong's view of universals, Armstrong says his view of universals is "relatively unexplored territory" but points to Hilary Putnam's 1970 paper 'On Properties'[33] as a possible forerunner. The wall being painted green is a truth for the proposition that it is not painted white and the proposition that it is not painted red and so on. [46], The difficulty in providing an adequate account of truthmakers for events in the past is one reason Armstrong gives for rejecting presentism—the view that only the present exists (another reason being the incompatibility of such a view with special relativity). His chief philosophical achievement has been the development of a core metaphysical programme, embracing the topics of universals, laws, modality and facts: a naturalistic metaphysics, consistent with a scientific view of the natural world. Eine zweite Ehe schloss er 1982 mit Jennifer Mary de Bohun Clark. In another, more modernbut equally entrenched sense, it implies the rejection of abstractobjects. Blobbiness also threatens Platonic universals: a particular instantiating a universal in a world of Platonic universals becomes a matter of the blob-particular having a relation to a universal elsewhere (in the Platonic heaven, say), rather than having an internal relation in the way that a chemical element does to a constituent atom. Armstrong is best known for his work on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. [5] He was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2008. David Armstrong's book is a contribution to the philosophical discussion about possible worlds. The result of all this intellectual work has been that Armstrong, along with so many others of his generation including his good friend David Lewis, have changed the way philosophers do philosophy and see the world. [22], In metaphysics, Armstrong defends the view that universals exist (although Platonic uninstantiated universals do not exist). David Armstrong. "The Nature of Mind" is a philosophical essay by David Armstrong, originally published in The Nature of Mind and Other Essays in 1980. David Malet Armstrong (8 July 1926 – 13 May 2014), often D. M. Armstrong, was an Australian philosopher. Dezember 2007 David Malet Armstrong (* 8. Seine Arbeiten haben die Entwicklung der Logik und Sprachphilosophie maßgeblich vorangetrieben. David M. Armstrong bei der Verleihung des D.Litt. In A Materialist Theory of Mind, he accepted that mental states such as consciousness exist, but stated that they can be explained as physical phenomena. David Armstrong (1926-2014) often D. M. Armstrong, was a prominent Australian Philosopher. [50], Armstrong's view of knowledge is that the conditions of knowledge are satisfied when you have a justified true belief that you arrived at through a reliable process: that is, the belief was caused by some factor in the external world (hence the label of externalism). They are part of the class of electrons because they are electrons. Under the theory of Armstrong, Tooley and Dretske, there is a relation of necessity between the universals ravenhood and blackness, rather than there being a relationship with every single raven. [6], Keith Campbell said that Armstrong's contributions to metaphysics and epistemology "helped to shape philosophy's agenda and terms of debate", and that Armstrong's work "always concerned to elaborate and defend a philosophy which is ontically economical, synoptic, and compatibly continuous with established results in the natural sciences". David Benjamin Kaplan (* 1933) ist ein US-amerikanischer Philosoph. Das Studium schloss er 1950 mit Auszeichnung ab. [39] This account posits that the relations between universals are truthmakers for the statements about physical laws, and it is realist as it accepts that laws of nature are a feature of the world rather than just a way we talk about the world. [23], Armstrong further rejects nominalisms that deny that properties and relations exist in reality because he suggests that these sorts of nominalisms, specifically referring to what he calls class nominalism, and resemblance nominalism, postulate primitives of either class membership or resemblance. In his essay The Nature of Mind, Armstrong outlines a philosophical account of the mind that is compatible with the Materialist scientific view of the mind. [53], On the question of the relationship between beliefs and knowledge, Armstrong defends a "weak acceptance" of the belief condition, namely that if a person can be said to know some thing p, he or she believes p. In a paper for the Aristotelian Society, Armstrong rejects a series of linguistic arguments for a rejection of the belief condition which argue that one can have knowledge without having belief because a common usage of the word 'belief' is to imply lack of knowledge—Armstrong gives the example of if you asked a man on a railway station whether the train has just left and he said "I believe it has", you would take from this that he does not know that it has. It is primarily through his work that Australian philosophy, and Australian metaphysics in particular, enjoys … Part II: God and Evil. [7], After studying at the University of Sydney, Armstrong undertook a B.Phil at the University of Oxford and a Ph.D at the University of Melbourne. ", "An Interview with Professor David Armstrong", "D.M. He once described his slogan as 'Put semantics last'[12] and, in Universals & Scientific Realism, he rebuts an arguments in favour of Plato's theory of forms that rely on semantics by describing "a long but, I think, on the whole discreditable tradition which tries to settle ontological questions on the basis of semantic considerations". Vor. Im Jahr 1950 heiratete er Madeleine Annette Haydon. Armstrong vertrat einen reduktiven Physikalismus. [23], Armstrong's theory of universals gives him the basis for an understanding of laws of nature as being relations between universals, a non-Humean account of laws of nature proposed independently by Armstrong,[37] Michael Tooley,[38] and Fred Dretske. Dabei setzt er sich von Gesetzesauffassungen in der Tradition David Humes ab, die Naturgesetze auf Regularitäten zurückführen wollen. [48] Armstrong attributes his adoption of the central-state theory to the work of J. J. C. Smart—specifically the paper 'Sensations and Brain Processes'—and traces the lineage from there to Ullin Place's 1956 paper 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process? This allows the explanation of laws of nature that have not been instantiated. [44] The possibility of one to many relations between truths and truthmakers is a feature that Armstrong believes allows truthmaker theory to answer some of the criticisms levelled at older correspondence theories of truth (of which he believes truthmaker theory to be an improved version). [18], Armstrong's development as a philosopher was influenced heavily by John Anderson, David Lewis, and J. J. C. Smart,[19] as well as by Ullin Place, Herbert Feigl, Gilbert Ryle and G. E. Reviewed by Alexander Bird, University of Bristol. Part I: Philosophy. Armstrong rejects dispositionalism, the idea that dispositional properties (or powers as they are sometimes referred to) are ontologically significant and have an important role in explaining laws of nature. Maya Eddon: Armstrong on Quantities and Resemblance (PDF; 2,4 MB), Philosophical Studies 136 (2007) 385–404; Daniel von Wachter: David Armstrong, in: Information Philosophie 5/2002, S. 24–29 (PDF; 46 kB) Daniel von Wachter: How to Misunderstand David Armstrong’s Theory of Possibility (PDF; 106 kB) Professor David Armstrong – obituary. in Philosophie führende Aufbaustudium zu ab-solvieren. [34], Central to Armstrong's philosophy is the idea of states of affairs ("facts" in Russell's terminology): in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, Armstrong claims that states of affairs are "the fundamental structures in reality". He justifies this by saying that the physical world "seems obviously to exist" while other things "seem much more hypothetical". [26] MacBride argues that there can be relations where the number of terms in the relation varies across instances. Armstrong uses the analogy of a thermometer: as a thermometer changes to reflect the temperature of the environment it is in, so must one's beliefs if they are reliably formed. [28], In Armstrong's view, nominalisms can also be criticised for producing a blob theory of reality. Armstrong realises that we will need to refer to and use properties that are not considered universals in his sparse ontology—for instance, being able to refer to something being a game (to use the example from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations). [12] He also served in the Royal Australian Navy, in which his father had been a commodore. In 1964, he became Challis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, where he stayed until his retirement in 1991. Published: May 31, 2008. [24], Armstrong's universals are "sparse": not every predicate will have an accompanying property, but only those which are deemed basic by scientific investigation. She both believes and disbelieves her husband is dead: it just happens that one of her two beliefs is justified, true and satisfies some knowledge conditions. Juli 1926, Melbourne, Australien) ist ein australischer Philosoph und Professor an der University of Sydney.… In Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, Armstrong states that his philosophical system rests upon "the assumption that all that exists is the space time world, the physical world as we say". David (D. M.) Armstrong is one of Australia's greatest philosophers. He has forgotten that at some point previously, he studied English history. Armstrong a défendu le physicalisme en métaphysique, le réalisme scientifique dans le champ épistémologique, ainsi qu'une forme réductionniste de matérialisme en philosophie de l'esprit. True/False. [52] The intuitions that lead to this kind of externalism led Alvin Plantinga towards an account of knowledge that added the requirement for 'properly-functioning' cognitive systems operating according to a design plan. Rather, it died mainly because of some virus that just happened to sweep through the population. Taking Wittgenstein's Tractatus as his point of departure, Professor Armstrong argues that nonactual possibilities and possible worlds are recombinations of actually existing elements, and as such are useful fictions. Dort erwarb er 1960 den PhD. [45] Negative truths have truthmakers in Armstrong's account: he gives the example of a wall that is painted green. Armstrong's philosophy is broadly naturalistic. Part III: Knowledge and Reality. Nach dem Schulbesuch in Oxford und Australien sowie Militärdienst bei der australischen Marine (1945/46) studierte Armstrong an der University of Sydney ab 1947 Philosophie. He taught at Birkbeck College in 1954–55, then at the University of Melbourne from 1956–63. David Malet Armstrong (born 8 July 1926), often D. M. Armstrong, is an Australian philosopher.He is well known for his work on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and for his defence of a factualist ontology, a functionalist theory of the mind, an externalist epistemology, and a necessitarian conception of the laws of nature. From this fundamental assumption flows a rejection of abstract objects including Platonic forms. Juli 1926, Melbourne, Australien; † 13. Juli 1926 in Melbourne, Australien; † 13. David Malet Armstrong kann als die herausragendste Gestalt in der australischen Philosophie über beinahe die ganze letzte Hälfte dieser Zeit gelten. Dabei vertrat er eine identitätstheoretische Position in der Tradition von John Smart und Ullin Place. Knowledge traditionally entails true belief, but true belief does not entail knowledge. (h.c.) der University of Nottingham am 13.

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